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Comparative Criminal Liability
Vera Bergelson

Abstract

This article continues to develop an argument in favor of comparative criminal liability started in “Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law,” (http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art19/) Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005). The essence of my argument is that people’s rights
are not static but depend on their actions, and victims may reduce their right not
to be harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver or assumption of risk, or involuntarily, by an attack on some legally recognized rights of the perpetrator. If
that happens, perpetrators should be entitled to a defense of complete or partial
justification, which would eliminate or diminish their criminal liability.
In this second piece, I respond to the commentaries by Dean Hurd and Professors Harel, Husak and Simons. At the same time I further develop the theory of
comparative criminal liability by focusing mainly on three groups of issues:
conceptual questions involving the underlying theory of rights; application of the
principle of conditionality of rights to particular areas of criminal law (e.g., assumption of risk, contributory negligence, attempts and endangerment, and multiple perpetrators); and practical implementation of the defense of comparative
criminal liability.
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Conditional Rights and Comparative
Wrongs: More on the Theory and
Application of Comparative Criminal
Liability
Vera Bergelson†
Dean Hurd and Professors Harel, Husak, and Simons
have raised a number of interesting questions in connection
with my argument for comparative criminal liability
pursuant to which the victim’s conduct should be taken into
account for proper determination of the perpetrator’s
liability.1 In “Victims and Perpetrators,” I suggested that
our rights are not static but depend on our actions. Based
on that principle, which I called the principle of
conditionality of rights, victims may reduce their right not
to be harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver, or
assumption of risk, or involuntarily, by an attack on some
legally recognized rights of the perpetrator.
If that
happens, perpetrators should be entitled to a defense of
complete or partial justification, which would eliminate or
diminish their criminal liability.
This article is an attempt to further develop the
proposed theory of comparative criminal liability while
addressing the most important issues brought up by the
commentators. These issues can be divided into three
† Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies at the Academy of
Sciences of the Soviet Union. I want to thank Dean Heidi M. Hurd and Professors
Alon Harel, Douglas Husak, and Kenneth W. Simons for their insightful and
stimulating comments and Professor Markus Dirk Dubber for the opportunity to
discuss some of the most fascinating problems of criminal law with some of the
most fascinating legal scholars. I am also grateful to Professors Norman L.
Cantor, Sherry F. Colb, Gary L. Francione, Howard Latin, John Leubsdorf, and
George Thomas for their thoughts and suggestions regarding this article; to my
research assistants Elina Leviyeva and Melanie L. Ryan for their help in
preparing this article for publication; and to the Dean’s Research Fund of Rutgers
School of Law-Newark for its financial support.
1. See Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005)
[hereinafter Victims and Perpetrators].
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groups: conceptual questions involving the underlying
theory of rights, application of the principle of
conditionality of rights to particular areas of criminal law,
and practical implementation of the advocated defense of
comparative criminal liability.2 Before I turn to these
issues, however, I would like to address some general
misunderstandings and make clear what I do not argue.
FIRST, contrary to what Simons3 and Hurd4 seem to
think, I do not argue that, in order to reduce the
perpetrator’s liability, the victim has to be at fault. True, a
faulty victim (e.g., a vicious aggressor) is the most
persuasive example of why we should view the criminal act
as an interaction. However, my thesis is broader. I
maintain that the victim’s conduct, faulty or not, may affect
the criminal liability of the perpetrator, if that conduct
changes the balance of rights and duties between the
perpetrator and the victim.
One does not have to be at fault to change the legal
relationship between oneself and another person. Consent
is an example of a voluntary no-fault change of status:
using Hurd’s words, it “turns a rape into love-making, a
kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a football
tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner
party.”5 As for an involuntary no-fault example, we can
think of a person whose nonculpable actions have put
another in a position of peril—e.g., a driver who, through
no fault of his own, hits a pedestrian. Despite his lack of

2. The first group of issues is discussed in paras. 1-3; the second group of
issues is discussed in paras. 4-8; and the third group of issues is discussed in
para. 9 of this article.
3. Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and
Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 541, 543-44; 545 (2005) (first arriving at an
erroneous conclusion that I consider victim’s fault necessary to reduce the
perpetrator’s culpability and then citing examples from my article that contradict
this conclusion).
4. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that
Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 503, 507, 507 n.5 (2005) (redefining my argument regarding
victim’s contributory responsibility in categories of faulty behavior).
5. Id. at 504.
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fault, the driver cannot simply drive off; he has suddenly
acquired a duty of care with respect to that pedestrian.
In other words, culpability is irrelevant to the
existence or magnitude of the wrongdoing (although it is
certainly relevant to the determination of responsibility).6
Moreover, if the victim is at fault, the comparative analysis
of the perpetrator’s and the victim’s culpability is
appropriate, among other tests, to determine their
comparative responsibility for the harm and, accordingly,
the extent to which the perpetrator’s liability should be
reduced. I discuss that in more detail in section III.C.4 of
my article.7
SECOND, I do not argue that the victim’s conduct is the
only ground that may provide full or partial justification for
an infringement on the victim’s rights.8
That would
certainly be incorrect. The victim’s rights may be overridden
although the victim did nothing to lose or reduce them. The
obvious example is the balance of evils, which provides
justification to the perpetrator who infringed on the rights of
the victim in order to preserve either some more important
rights of other people or equally important rights of a larger
group of people. The principle of conditionality of rights,
according to which the victim’s conduct may affect the
perpetrator’s liability, is just one principle among other ones
capable of affecting people’s rights.

6. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law
334 (1997).
Causing harm to another without justification is sufficient for wrongdoing,
but it is not sufficient for responsibility. Responsibility requires, in
addition, that the wrongdoer be culpable. That X violated Y’s rights with
his action, and that X thereby did wrong, is one question; whether X is
responsible because he did so culpably, is another and separate question
which has nothing to do with causing Y harm.
Id. at 334-35.
7. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 475.
8. See Alon Harel, Victims and Perpetrators: The Case against a Unified
Theory of Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 489,
493 (2005) (observing that the principle of conditionality of rights applies only to
cases in which the victim’s actions, and not the state of affairs brought about by
the victim’s or someone else’s actions, affect the perpetrator’s duties toward the
victim).
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THIRD, I do not argue that the principle of
conditionality of rights “is a natural extension of the
traditional ‘heat of passion’ doctrine, which partly justifies
an actor who responds violently to certain types of
unjustified provocation.”9 I wonder whether Simons might
have confused two independent arguments—one, analytical,
based on the theory of rights,10 and the other, more specific,
calling for consistency of legal rules.11 The defense of
provocation, or “heat of passion,” due to its dual nature
(combination of justification and excuse) and merely
mitigating character, only partially embodies the principle of
conditionality of rights. Unlike that defense, the principle of
conditionality of rights is entirely justificatory in nature; it
provides support for both full and partial defenses; and it
does not require provocative actions on the part of the victim
or violent actions on the part of the perpetrator.12
FOURTH, I do not argue that the defense of
comparative criminal liability can be only partial. I am not
sure what led Husak to this conclusion,13 but I most
certainly intended the opposite when I repeatedly said
throughout the article that “[i]n some circumstances, the
victim’s conduct would provide a complete justification,
whereas in other circumstances it would only mitigate the
defendant’s liability.”14
9. Simons, supra note 3, at 553.
10. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 462-65.
11. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 432-35.
12. For example, a tenant is completely justified if he paints the entire house
black upon obtaining his landlord’s consent to use any color he wishes. Even if
that act reduces the market value of the house and even if the landlord regrets
his unwise decision the very moment he sees the result (i.e. the landlord is
objectively and subjectively harmed), the tenant is completely justified in what he
did because the landlord has transferred to him the power to choose the color for
the house.
13. Douglas Husak, Comparative Fault in Criminal Law: Conceptual and
Normative Perplexities, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 523, 531 (2005).
Of course, Bergelson does not want victim fault to function as a complete
defense, but rather as a fault mitigator. Her thesis that victim fault should
provide a partial rather than a complete defense led to her previous
assertion that victim fault results in a reduction rather than in a total
forfeiture of rights.
14. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 487.
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Both consent and self-defense can serve as complete
exculpation or partial mitigation, depending on the facts.
For example, self-defense is a complete justification for
homicide if the defendant applied reasonably necessary
force in order to protect his own life against the victim’s
attack. However, if the defendant exceeded what was
reasonably necessary under the circumstances, he should
be entitled only to mitigation of his criminal liability. As I
explain in my article, in that case, he should be responsible
for the “extra” force because the attacker has lost his right
not to be attacked at all, but retained a right not to be
attacked with a disproportionate amount of force.15
In fact, out of the recognized applications of the
principle of conditionality of rights, only the defense of
provocation is partial by design. Consent, assumption of
risk, and self-defense can be “perfect” or “imperfect,” but
provocation is always “imperfect” in the sense that it
applies only to situations in which the defendant has
overstepped the boundaries of behavior warranted by the
actions of the victim. I doubt that Husak would object to
the partial nature of the defense of provocation.
***
With these clarifications, I turn to some of the issues
raised by the commentators. I am pleased that all four of
them seem to agree with my general thesis that there are
circumstances when the victim’s conduct must be taken
into consideration in order to determine fairly the
magnitude of the perpetrator’s criminal liability. I can only
second Husak in that “anyone who contends that victim
fault is and ought to be irrelevant in all cases simply does
not know what he is talking about.”16 In the rest of this
article, I discuss certain specific implications of this thesis.

15. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 466.
16. Husak, supra note 13, at 523.
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I. WHAT DO CONSENT, SELF-DEFENSE, AND PROVOCATION
HAVE IN COMMON?
My general claim is that by his acts a person (A) can
change the balance of rights between himself and another
(B), and thereby either eliminate B’s criminal liability or at
least reduce the seriousness of B’s wrongdoing. I am
grateful to Harel for bringing up Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld’s typology and showing where the principle of
conditionality of rights fits into it.17 That my argument
indirectly draws on Hohfeld’s vision of rights is beyond
doubt: it is impossible today to talk about rights without
taking into account Hohfeld’s classic work.18 Moreover, in
building my proposal, I employ theories of rights, among
others, of Judith Jarvis Thomson and Joel Feinberg who in
turn have absorbed and expanded Hohfeld’s ideas.
Considering this well-established intellectual tradition,
to which all four of my commentators have made valuable
contributions, I am somewhat puzzled that Harel19 and
Simons20 refuse to see the conceptual link between the
doctrines of consent, self-defense, and, to some degree (since
it is only in part a defense of justification), provocation.
While these doctrines apply to different circumstances, they
have a similar effect on one’s rights and, through that, on
the attribution of harm and imposition of liability.

17. Harel writes:
As such this principle identifies circumstances in which a person can
unilaterally create, extinguish, or transform obligations imposed on
another person. A right to change the normative status of others is a right
labeled by Hohfeld a power (or ability). Under Hohfeld’s characterization,
stating that a person A has a power (or ability) to X implies that A is
capable of changing the legal (or moral) rights of others.
Harel, supra note 8, at 491.
18. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
19. Harel, supra note 8, at 496 (“I can see nothing useful in lumping the power
a person has to extinguish duties owed to her by consent together with the power
she has to extinguish duties owed to her by attacking other people.”).
20. Simons, supra note 3, at 544 (claiming that it is “both unhelpful and
misleading” to suggest that a single principle “explains and justifies these three
exceptions as well as Bergelson’s proposed expansion of the three categories”).
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To have a right means to have a certain moral and/or
legal status that defines the scope of freedoms and
obligations between the right holder and others. People
can terminate or suspend their rights and thereby change
these freedoms and obligations. In one of her essays,
Thomson reviews various ways in which people may cease
to have rights.21 Among those are consent, waiver, and
forfeiture. Each of them functions to transfer privileges,
claims, and powers from the right holder to others.
Consent, for example, may exist in the form of giving
permission, which extends privileges and claims to the
consent receiver. If A tells B, “Feel free to eat this salad,”
A both gives B the privilege of eating the salad and
promises not to interfere with B’s exercising this
privilege.22 Consent may also extend powers. If A tells B,
“Do whatever you want with this salad,” A gives B the
power to become the salad owner, to make someone else the
salad owner, or to abandon the salad altogether.23 Even
without going into details, it is clear that by giving consent
a person at the very least waives the right that certain
things not be done to him or his property.
Forfeiture of a right has the same effect: a person gives
up the right that certain things not be done to him.
Forfeiture may happen without fault, e.g., by choosing not
to exercise a right. More often, however, examples of
forfeiture involve fault. Take one used by Thomson: B
villainously acts in a way that, if no one interferes, will
constitute a violation of a claim of A’s.24
Thomson
concludes that if A can defend himself against B’s violation
of his claim only by causing B harm, then A has a privilege
of doing so because, by his own acts, B has divested himself
of a claim against A.25

21. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ceasing to Have a Right, in The Realm of Rights
348 (1990).
22. Id. at 348, 352.
23. Id. at 352-53.
24. Id. at 361.
25. Id. at 361-62.
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In other words, A’s consent to B’s doing certain things
and A’s violation of B’s rights allowing B to act in selfdefense have one and the same effect: A ceases to have a
right; therefore, B violates no right of A. Is there a good
reason for “lumping . . . together”26 specific defenses that (i)
originate from the same theory of rights; (ii) are, using
Harel’s words, examples of victim-specific powers; and (iii)
have the same effect on the rights and duties of the
participants of an interaction? I would think so.
II. RIGHTS: LIMITED OR REDUCED?
A significant portion of Husak’s comment is devoted to
the discussion of what he calls “conceptual perplexities” in
connection with the principle of conditionality of rights.
Husak raises a valid question about the general theory of
rights that would support that principle. Suggesting an
inconsistency in my approach, Husak presents the principle
of conditionality of rights as a case of specification (which,
as I hope to show in a moment, it is not), and then
successfully attacks his own erroneous supposition.
I am grateful to Husak for this misunderstanding—it
gives me an opportunity to better define my views and
explore certain nuances of which I did not think before.
Thus, I would like to reply not to Husak’s interpretation of
my proposal but instead to his original question: how does
the principle of conditionality of rights fit into a broader
theory of rights? For the lack of space, this reply is
inevitably just a road map.
Husak is correct that I do not view people’s rights,
even the most fundamental ones (like the right to life or
bodily security), as absolute.27 If they were absolute, we
would be morally and legally paralyzed every time two
identical absolute rights (for example, rights to life of two
different persons) clashed.28 The principle of conditionality
26. Harel, supra note 8, at 496.
27. Husak, supra note 13, at 526-27.
28. For an excellent discussion of why rights are not absolute, see, e.g., Joel
Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 Phil. & Pub.
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of rights explicitly recognizes the non-absolute character of
rights by providing that one may lose or reduce them due to
his own right-altering conduct, e.g., by consent or an attack
on rights of others.
Since I do not view rights as absolute, I naturally do not
subscribe to the theory of specification.
Under the
specification theory, individuals do not “cease” to have
rights—their rights are limited from the outset and, in this
limited form, are absolute. For example, a person does not
have a right not to be killed. He only has the right—yet the
absolute right—not to be killed wrongly or unjustly
(pursuant to the moral version of specification) or except in
certain circumstances (pursuant to factual specification).
My argument presumes that people’s rights are not absolute
and that they may be lost or reduced, which means that the
theory of rights I employ is anything but specification.29
There are a couple of reasons why I reject the
specification theory. One is that, following Feinberg, I am
pessimistic about the plausibility of fully defining a right—
it would take volumes and it has never been actually
done.30 Yet more importantly, specification is based on an
“incorrect view of rights,”31 pursuant to which, if there are

Aff., 93, 97-99 (1978) (pointing out that a conflict between two absolute rights is
“logically impossible in just the manner of a hypothetical conflict between an
irresistible force and an immoveable object”). Feinberg has defined absolute
rights in the following way:
An absolute right (if there is such a thing) is a right that would remain in
one’s possession, fully effective as a ground for other people’s duties to one,
in all possible circumstances. If my right to X is absolute, then there are no
circumstances in which it is “subject to legitimate limitation” or in which
the correlated duties of others to me in respect to X are suspended. If the
right is absolute, then I possess it, and others are bound to me in the
appropriate ways in all circumstances without exception.
Id. at 97-98. See also Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, in Rights,
Restitution, and Risk 33, 40-42 (William Parent ed., 1986); Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, id. at 49; and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Rights and Compensation, id. at 66.
29. For a similar point, see Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28,
at 40 (observing that “neither [factual nor moral specification] would be opted for
by anyone who did not take the view that rights are, in a certain sense, absolute”).
30. See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 99-100.
31. Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28, at 39-40.
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circumstances when someone’s right has a priority over
mine, it means that I never had the relevant right in the
first place.
Take a well-known example with mountaineers who
saved their lives by breaking into someone’s cabin and
staying there for a few days while waiting out a snow
storm. Of course, under any theory of rights, the actions of
the mountaineers were justified as the “lesser evil”: by
invading the cabin owner’s property rights in his cabin and
food, they avoided a greater harm of death or serious
injuries to the members of the group. The specification
theory, however, would justify the mountaineers not
because their right to life was more important than the
cabin owner’s property rights, but because the cabin
owner’s property rights were limited from the outset and
simply did not exist under the described circumstances.
Thus the mountaineers did not infringe on any rights at all.
But is that correct? I think not. Because if that were
the case, the cabin owner would not be entitled to any
compensation for the consumed food or other loss caused by
the mountaineers. And, as we know, the law does provide
for compensation to a party whose rights were invaded in a
case of private necessity. Therefore, it is inaccurate to say
that the cabin owner’s property rights were limited from
the outset. One could say, as I sometimes do in “Victims
and Perpetrators,” that they are conditionally limited, but
all that really means is that they are not limited until and
unless a certain condition is satisfied.
Husak’s erroneous assumption that the principle of
conditionality of rights is based on the specification theory
leads him to say that this principle “is not compatible with
a theory that alleges that victims forfeit their rights by
engaging in faulty behavior.”32 In my view, this conclusion
is incorrect: by acting in a certain way, a person may
trigger a condition on which a certain right of his depends.
As Thomson puts it, an aggressor “(conditionally) divests
himself of claims he had formerly had: here there is not
32. Husak, supra note 13, at 528.
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permissible infringement of claims, but the forfeiting of
them.”33 In fact, out of the three theories discussed by
Thomson,34 the principle of conditionality of rights is
probably closest to the “forfeit” theory—with two caveats.
One, “forfeit” is a loaded term. For my purposes, it is
more accurate to talk about the loss or reduction of rights,
not their complete forfeiture. A right that has been lost
may be regained; “forfeit” suggests that the right has been
lost forever.35
The other caveat is perhaps more important. It seems
to me that we should use different theories when explaining
situations involving a victim who chose to change his moral
status vis-à-vis the perpetrator and situations in which the
victim lacked either actus reus or the requisite mens rea. In
the second instance (which would include cases of “innocent
aggressors,”36 “innocent threats”37 and “innocent shields”38),
33. Thomson, supra note 21, at 362.
34. The three theories are “forfeit,” “specification,” and “overriding.” See
Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28, at 33-48.
35. Thomson acknowledges this difference: “[S]aying that Aggressor simply
ceased to have the right is not the same as saying that Aggressor has forfeited the
right.” Id. at 37.
36. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive SelfProtection, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475 (1999). Alexander defines “innocent
aggressors” as
[t]hose who appear to be attacking me without legal justification, but who
are legally and morally nonculpable in doing so. They may be acting on a
reasonable but mistaken belief that I am threatening them or others. They
may be insane. Or they may be small children who have picked up loaded
pistols.
Id. at 1481-82.
37. See, e.g. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to
Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (1999).
Finkelstein writes:
The innocent threat is a man who has been pushed off the edge of a cliff
and is barreling toward you as you sit on a terrace below. The problem is
that he is fat, very fat, and if he lands on you he will kill you. The only
thing you have time to do is shift the position of an awning over your head.
If you do shift the awning, he will be catapulted into a ravine and die, and
you will survive. If you do not shift the awning, you will die and he will
survive, because you will break his fall.
Id. at 1369.
38. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 35 (1974). Nozick
defines innocent shields as
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the “overriding” and not the loss/reduction of rights rationale
may be more appropriate.
Compare, for example, cases of self-defense against a
villainous aggressor and against an “innocent threat.” In
both instances the perpetrator is justified in causing harm
to the victim (to the extent that is necessary to protect the
perpetrator against the harm the victim would otherwise
cause him). But in the first case the victim did something
to deserve that, whereas in the second case the unfortunate
victim just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong
time. The rationale behind the “innocent threat” cases
seems to be the same as behind the “necessity” cases.
Unlike the villainous aggressor, an “innocent threat” victim
does not lose or reduce his right to life; this right is
overridden by considerations of “greater good.”
Husak asks how a person may “reduce” his right not to
be harmed. As I explain in my article, by this general right
not to be harmed I mean a cluster of distinguishable rights:
for example, not to be attacked, not to be attacked with
deadly weapons, not to be physically hurt, seriously
injured, maimed, tortured, raped, or killed.39 If I attack you
using a stuffed animal as a weapon, I may lose my right not
to be attacked but most likely I will not lose my right not to
be killed. What happened then to my general right not to
be harmed? I retained some of the rights that form it but
not all. It became more limited, “reduced.”
I argue that a person very seldom, if ever, loses all of
the specific rights forming this general right not to be
harmed. Partly this is so because we view certain rights as
inalienable. The right not to be severely tortured (at least
tortured to death) is probably one of them. In current law
and moral philosophy, a person may neither waive nor

those innocent persons who themselves are nonthreats but who are so
situated that they will be damaged by the only means available for
stopping the threat. Innocent persons strapped onto the front of the tanks
of aggressors so that the tanks cannot be hit without also hitting them are
innocent shields . . . .
Id.
39. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 465-66.
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forfeit that right. Another reason why a person may not
lose all his rights is the teleological nature of the
permission to cause non-consensual harm. For example,
B’s privilege to harm A is limited to the amount of harm
necessary for the protection of B’s rights that are about to
be violated by A.
In this regard, it is interesting to turn to Husak’s
argument about rape. He sees “no reason to exempt rape
from the class of offenses for which victim fault can
According to
mitigate the liability of perpetrators.”40
Husak, one situation in which the perpetrator’s liability
might be mitigated is post-penetration rape.41 I disagree
with that for a number of reasons.
In my view, sex without consent is sex without
consent, no matter when the consent was refused.
Moreover, if the reason for withdrawing consent is, say,
physical pain or emotional discomfort caused by the
intercourse, there is a good chance the victim was not
aware that she would experience this pain or discomfort
when she gave her consent.
I fail to see why the
perpetrator who ignored the victim’s pleas to stop is less
guilty simply because at some point in the past the victim
did not object.
To be sure, Husak is right that rape, like any other
crime, can be graded.42 For example, under the Wisconsin
Penal Code, a person who has a sexual intercourse with
another without consent is guilty of third degree sexual
assault. If, in addition, the perpetrator uses or threatens to
40. Husak, supra note 13, at 533.
41. Id. at 533. Husak suggests that the best way to accomplish this mitigation
is by “enacting a new crime of post-penetration rape, less serious than a crime in
which consent is not given at all.” Id. at 534, n.31.
42. Practically all states do grade sexual offenses. See, e.g., Robert R.
Lawrence, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility
of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 1657, 1664 (1984) (observing that most states have adopted graded
“sexual offense” legislation). Moreover, it is probably unhelpful to use “rape” as a
generic name for every sexual offense. Not every homicide is murder; the same
way, not every sexual offense is rape. In fact, some states have abandoned this
term altogether. Instead, the offense is called “criminal sexual conduct.” See,
e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.520a to .520e, .520i (1996).
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use force or violence, his offense goes up one notch to
second degree sexual assault. The use or threat of use of a
dangerous weapon brings it up to first degree sexual
assault.43 This differentiating between more and less
significant threat, however, has nothing to do with the
victim’s contribution.44
Under the principle of conditionality of rights, a victim
may lose her right not to be harmed either voluntarily or
involuntarily. To lose this right voluntarily, the victim must
consent to a certain act.
Naturally, consent to any
continuous personal contact is revocable. By consenting to
undergo a root canal procedure or to attend a friend’s poetry
reading, one does not acquire an obligation to go through the
painful experience until the very end. Moreover, one does
not assume the risk that the dentist will continue drilling
despite the patient’s desperate objections. It seems obvious
that the same should be true for sexual intimacy, no matter
what was the reason for a request to stop it—pain,
psychological discomfort, or anything else.
Now, can a person involuntarily lose her right not to be
raped? One may forfeit a right to bodily inviolability only if
that person has infringed upon an important right of
another.45 In other words, post-penetration rape may be
fully or partially justified if the perpetrator had a right that
his sexual partner would continue the intercourse as long
43. Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (1999).
44. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) reduces rape from a felony of the first
degree to the felony of the second degree if the victim was a “voluntary social
companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime” or had “previously
permitted him sexual liberties.” Model Penal Code § 213.1(1) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). I will not add anything new by saying that the Sexual Offenses
section of the MPC should have been revised a long time ago. See, e.g., Deborah
W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be
Pulled and Replaced, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 207, 209-10 (2003) (criticizing the
MPC rape rules). In addition to the cited provision, the gender-specific language
(§§ 213.1-213.4); the marital rape exception (§§ 213.1-213.6); the offense of
seduction by promise to marry (§ 213.3(1)(d)); and the defense, available in
certain instances, of the victim’s sexual promiscuity (§ 213.6(3)) are, to put it
mildly, outdated, and embarrassing to see in the influential document like the
MPC.
45. I am not discussing here whether one’s right not to be raped may be
overridden, e.g., under the balance of evils.
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as the perpetrator desired. I do not believe such a right
exists. Courts refuse to order specific performance even of
commercial contracts for personal services because to do so
“would . . . run contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition against involuntary servitude.”46 To the extent
values of liberty and personal autonomy are worth
anything, frustrated sexual expectations may give rise to a
grudge but not to a legal (or moral) right to proceed with
the unwanted intimacy.
Even if the victim violated a legitimate right of the
perpetrator, should her misconduct partially justify rape?
Let’s say a woman slaps a man on the face, he loses control,
and in the state of rage, he rapes her. I do not think that in
this case the defendant should be granted mitigation
either. Rape is no different from physical torture, which is
not subject to the defense of provocation and, in my view,
justly so.47 Considerations of human dignity and autonomy
dictate that certain rights, including the right not to be
tortured or raped, may not be forfeitable.48
Finally, to be justified under the theory of self-defense,
the rape must be immediately necessary to prevent the
victim from causing serious harm to the perpetrator. I
guess a case of “raping in self-defense” would look like that:
a woman attacks a man with a knife. The man is not
armed. To prevent the woman from stabbing him, he has
only one choice: to rape her.
I may be lacking in
imagination but I have trouble visualizing this scenario.

46. Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir.
1996).
47. See, e.g., Sensobaugh v. State, 244 S.W. 379, 379 (Tex. App. 1922)
(denying defense of provocation to defendant who maimed his wife’s lover without
the intent to kill); see also Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 473, n.342
(pointing out that rape and torture do not satisfy the excusatory requirement of
provocation pursuant to which the perpetrator must act impulsively, in an
immediate response to the offense).
48. For discussion of excusatory requirements that prevent rape from being
covered by the defense of provocation, see Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1,
at 473-74, n.342.
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III. RIGHTS: MORAL OR LEGAL?

In my article, I argue that one way for a victim to lose
or reduce his right not to be harmed is by violating a legal
right of the perpetrator. Husak disagrees that the right in
question should be legal rather than moral. He claims that
“[a]ttempts to use our legal rights to decide when victim
fault alters the criminal liability of perpetrators are both
too broad as well as too narrow.”49
In an attempt to prove that my approach is too broad,
Husak wonders: “In some Muslim countries, for example,
women have no legal right to dress provocatively. Would
Bergelson conclude that an Afghani woman who broke the
law by wearing a miniskirt in public provides a partial
defense for Afghani rapists?”50 A couple of paragraphs
later, Husak answers his own rhetorical question,
admitting that perhaps his counterexamples “betray a
misunderstanding”51 of the principle of conditionality of
rights, which, as my article indicates, “require[s] the
offender to have the right that the victim not behave as she
does,”52 and does not simply mitigate the offender’s liability
due to any illegal act by the victim.
But if the right that the victim not behave the way she
did is personal, how can we explain the defense of others?
Under the common law, the right applied only to the
defense of family members and close associates.53 The
restriction was a result of the right’s origin: it evolved from
the right to protect one’s property, particularly one’s
household (including one’s wife, children, servants, etc.). 54
Today, the rationale is somewhat different—the right to
defend others is viewed as a derivative right, an extension

49. Husak, supra note 13, at 535.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 536.
52. Id.
53. 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 170 (2004).
54. See Rollin Morris Perkins, Criminal Law, 1018-19 (2d ed. 1969); 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1979) (1769).
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of the attacked person’s self-defense,55 a form of
subrogation of rights: “One asserting the justification of
defense of another steps into the position of the person
defended. Defense of another takes its form and content
from defense of self.”56 Clearly, this subrogation is possible
only when the person whose rights are at risk is
identifiable.
Various victimless crimes, including the
hypothetical offense of wearing a miniskirt, do not allow
any private citizen to assert a personal right that has been
violated and the protection of which might be delegated to
or assumed by another.
Whereas
Husak
fails
to
demonstrate
the
overinclusiveness of the principle of conditionality of rights,
his argument that the principle may be underinclusive has
merit. We can think of a number of examples, particularly
in the area of provocation, in which the victim acts
immorally but legally with respect to the perpetrator (e.g.,
taunts or insults him), and we intuitively feel that, if, in
these circumstances, the perpetrator overreacts and
assaults the victim, his liability should be reduced.57 I
share this intuition, yet I would reduce the perpetrator’s
liability through partial excuse and retain full or partial
justification only for the violation of legal rights.58
My choice is mandated by practical as well as
theoretical considerations. Let’s say we chose the violation
of the perpetrator’s moral (instead of legal) rights as the
ground for reducing his liability—how would we decide
what moral rights people possess? Searching, as Husak
invites me to do, for a “broad and deep”59 societal consensus
as to whether particular lawful behavior is nevertheless
55. See, e.g., Ducket v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944-45 (Wyo. 1998).
56. Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d. 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979).
57. Simons and Harel make similar arguments. See Harel, supra note 8, at
501-02 (arguing that the provoking act need not be a violation of duty on the part
of the victim); see also Simons, supra note 3, at 562 (“It would be plausible, on a
partial justification rationale, to mitigate in the case of a victim who subjected the
defendant to intense and protracted emotional abuse, even if that abuse is not
otherwise criminal or tortious.”).
58. See, Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 476.
59. Husak, supra note 13, at 537.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC

584

4/20/2005 11:43 AM

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:567

immoral does not strike me as a good practical solution.
How shall we do the searching—by polls? Shall we make
participation in these polls mandatory, under the penalty
of law, in order to ensure that the consensus is in fact
“broad and deep”? How often shall we conduct these polls?
And would not the very questions asked reveal inevitable
social and cultural biases? In other words, how can we
legitimately define the scope of overwhelmingly recognized
moral and immoral conduct?60
An alternative solution suggested by Husak is to reject
the conventional morality in favor of critical morality.61
This seems to be an appealing option, until we start
thinking of its practical implementation. I wonder how we
would go about incorporating these moral rights into a
legal definition of the new defense? How would we (a)
determine, and (b) notify the community of what this “true”
morality entails, i.e., what behavior is justifiable? Husak,
for instance, seems to believe that, by agreeing to sexual
penetration, a woman diminishes her right not to be forced
to have sexual intercourse against her will.62 I believe
otherwise. Critical morality, by definition, has the “correct”
answer but neither Husak nor I nor the rest of the
community can claim the privilege of its superior
knowledge.
60. Judge Hand has raised similar concerns in his famous immigration
decisions when he pointed out the difficulty of determining what constitutes a
“good moral character” or “the generally accepted moral conventions current at
the time.” Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949). He found
the task imposed on courts “impossible of assured execution; people differ as
much about moral conduct as they do about beauty.” Johnson v. United States,
186 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1951). He criticized the notion that the court could rely
on the “judgment of some ethical elite, even if any criterion were available to
select them.” Id. Judge Hand also considered and rejected the possibility of poll
data. “Even though we could take a poll, it would not be enough merely to count
heads, without any appraisal of the voters.” Schmidt, 177 F.2d at 451.
61. See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 20 (1963) (differentiating
positive morality, “the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social
group,” from critical morality, “the general moral principles used in the criticism
of actual social institutions including positive morality”).
62. Husak, supra note 13, at 533-34 (suggesting that post-penetration
revocation of consent is the kind of victim behavior that should reduce the
perpetrator’s liability).
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As a result, had we followed Husak’s suggestion,
judges and jurors would have no better guidance than their
own understanding of critical morality—i.e., in the end the
conventional (or even personal, idiosyncratic), and not
critical, morality would determine the perpetrator’s
culpability. Considering the variety of opinions on many
moral issues in any society, and particularly in a
multicultural society like ours, that would lead to
inconsistent, unpredictable, and unfair verdicts.
Due to these concerns, my proposal is intentionally
curtailed. I advocate an affirmative defense that would
completely or partially justify the perpetrator if, among
other things, the victim has violated the perpetrator’s legal
rights. These rights should be legal and not merely moral
because the scope of protected rights must be clearly and
legitimately defined and communicated to the community.63
This is required by the very principle of legality considered
to be the first principle of American criminal law
jurisprudence.64
In addition, using moral instead of legal rights to
determine legal liability is a dangerous step back to the
overwhelmingly criticized and rejected doctrine of “moral
wrong.” Pursuant to that doctrine, a person would lose a
right to invoke a defense (mistake of fact) if he acted
immorally, although not illegally, and his act produced a
criminal result.65 Similarly to the “moral wrong” doctrine,
Husak’s proposal may cause the victim to lose a legal right

63. See, e.g., People v. Phyfe, 32 N.E. 978 (N.Y. 1893) (holding that a “citizen
is entitled to an unequivocal warning before conduct on his part . . . can be made
the occasion of a deprivation of his liberty or property”); People v. Arroyo, 777
N.Y.S. 2d 836, 844 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (applying the same rule).
64. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 39 (3d ed. 2001).
65. Id. at 157. The classic case in which the doctrine was applied is Regina v.
Prince, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (1875), in which the defendant was prosecuted for
“unlawfully tak[ing] or caus[ing] to be taken, any unmarried girl, being under the
age of sixteen years, out of the possession . . . of her father . . . .” The defendant
believed the girl to be eighteen, whereas in fact she was only fourteen. The court
convicted the defendant, denying him the defense of a mistake of fact because,
even if the circumstances had been as he believed them to be, his act would have
been immoral.
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(e.g., not to be assaulted) simply because she did something
immoral (e.g., broke a promise).
Therefore, in my view, it is preferable to be somewhat
underinclusive and limit the application of the principle of
conditionality of rights to legal rights only. This seems to
be a reasonable solution from both the theoretical and
practical perspectives. It still allows a court to apply the
defense of excuse to limit the perpetrator’s liability if it
finds that the victim’s immoral but legal behavior would
make a reasonable person lose his temper. And, as a policy
matter, it promotes respect for the law by maintaining that
a person whose behavior was absolutely legal, even if mean
and malicious, may not be justifiably assaulted.
IV. ASSUMPTION OF RISK: UNREASONABLE BUT LEGAL AND
MORAL BEHAVIOR OF THE VICTIM
In conclusion, Husak poses what he considers to be the
hardest question about comparative liability: should it
apply to situations in which the victim acted unreasonably,
In Husak’s
although perfectly legally and morally?66
example, some of his colleagues irresponsibly fail to install
software that would protect their computers from viruses.
He asks: “To what extent should perpetrators who
deliberately create a computer virus be less culpable for all
of the harms that occur—even those harms that would
have been prevented if victims had taken reasonable
precautions?”67
In my mind, the perpetrator’s liability should not be
affected by merely stupid or irresponsible acts of the victim.
A car thief’s liability should not be reduced simply because
the car owner has left his car unlocked; and a rapist’s
liability should not be reduced because a jogger has chosen
a deserted section of the Central Park for her evening
exercise.68
66. Husak, supra note 13, at 538.
67. Id. at 539.
68. My views are shared by some and opposed by some of my commentators.
Cf. Hurd, supra note 4, at 510 (arguing that “the law would be unwise to
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One does not owe criminals a duty to protect oneself or
one’s property from their intentional criminal acts.69 That
is not to say that the victim owes no duty to anyone. For
example, in torts, as Simons correctly notes, a car owner
who has left the car key in the ignition is not at fault with
respect to the car thief but may be at fault with respect to a
third party who was run over by the car thief.70 Similarly,
an irresponsible faculty member may be at fault with
respect to his colleagues whose computers were infected
because of his lack of due care. He may be reprimanded or
even fined but that will have no effect on the hacker’s
liability because the careless faculty member owed no duty
of care to him.

articulate an assumption of risk defense that reduced the criminal penalty for
wrongdoing every time a victim knowingly and voluntarily encountered its
prospect”).
For we should then find that a woman who wore a low-cut red dress to a
rough bar reduced her rights against rape if she knew that in dressing
provocatively she might incite the unwanted attentions of a drunken
aggressor. And we should find that the jogger who entered Central Park at
dusk knowing of the risk of being mugged was complicit in his own
mugging; his voluntary assumption of a known risk properly reduces the
penalty imposed on the predictable assailant. And we should find that the
woman who ran to the store for a jug of orange juice on New Year’s Eve
voluntarily reduced her rights against being struck by a drunk driver, for
she knowingly and voluntarily invited those risks when she ventured onto
the roads on that treacherous night. And we should find that a person who
knowingly left her keys in her car invited its theft, thus reducing the
penalty justifiably imposed on the car thief.
Id. But see Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181 (1994)
(arguing that criminal law should punish perpetrators who commit crimes
against careless victims less severely). For my critique of Harel’s position, see
Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 424-25, 467.
69. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. Rev.
347, 356 (1996).
The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence. They are
entitled to move in the world at large with as much freedom as they enjoy
behind locked doors. They can walk in the park when they want, sit where
they want in the subway, and wear skimpy clothes without fearing that
they will be faulted for precipitating rape.
Id. See also, Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 473-74.
70. Simons, supra note 3, at 556.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC

588

4/20/2005 11:43 AM

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:567
V. CONSENT V. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

I must admit, I find completely fascinating the way
Hurd builds her case for distinguishing between consent
and assumption of risk. Moreover, I have nothing against
“splitting the doctrinal baby”;71 however, I’d prefer the cut
to be across a different joint.
Hurd starts with critically looking at my analysis of
the defense of consent in torts.72
Following the
Restatement, I maintain that, to be effective, consent must
be given for the particular conduct, or to substantially the
same conduct.73 What Hurd does not like in this language
is the word “conduct,” which presumably applies to both
actual consent and assumption of risk. She draws a line
between one’s consent to another’s (i) physical contact with
his person or property, and (ii) wrongful conduct, assuming
one appreciates its risks and wrongfulness. In the first
case, consent is “morally magical: it eliminates wrongdoing
altogether.” In the second case, consent makes the victim
partially responsible for the resulting harm or loss.
I am not sure this distinction is helpful. It is not clear
to me, for instance, why we should put consent to physical
contact into a separate category. What if X consents to
someone watching her take a shower, or taking nude
pictures of her, or posting those pictures on the Internet?
There is no physical contact involved in any of these
situations. However, X’s consent seems to be equally
“morally magical” in that it completely eliminates
wrongdoing.
Moreover, if Hurd’s goal is to “accurately parse
between those who drag race and those who leave their
keys in vehicles stolen by drag racers,”74 she does not need
this distinction. Hurd correctly underscores that to lose a

71. Hurd, supra note 4, at 513.
72. Id. at 511-12.
73. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(2)(b) (1979) (“To be effective,
consent must be to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.”);
cmt. to 892A(2) (same).
74. Hurd, supra note 4, at 512.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art32

BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC

2005]

4/20/2005 11:43 AM

REPLY

589

right voluntarily, the victim has to “consent to the
defendant’s wrongful conduct, and not just to the risk that
that conduct will occur.”75 A person assumes the risk that
this particular conduct may cause him harm; however, he
does not assume the risk of different conduct. Accordingly,
a woman who consents to a kiss runs a risk that she may
contract her partner’s herpes; yet she does not assume the
risk of being raped.
In my view, a more important distinction between
consent and its constructive form, assumption of risk, is that
a person may, expressly or tacitly, consent to the unlawful
conduct of another; in that case he becomes a coauthor of his
injury. These are, for instance, cases of drag racing and
Russian roulette. However, a person may not be deemed to
have assumed the risk of the unlawful conduct of another.
That is so because people who violate the law have no right
to force others to accommodate their criminal behavior by
acting in a certain way or refraining from action. A different
rule would reward unlawful behavior at the cost of lawful
behavior, which would be both unfair and inefficient. The
law may not force people to sacrifice their liberty so that
wrongdoers do not get “greater opportunities for
wrongdoing.”76 Therefore, the woman who ran to the store
for a jug of orange juice on New Year’s Eve did not assume
the risk of being struck by a drunk driver, just as the
hapless colleague of Husak did not assume the risk of
having his computer attacked by a hacker.
VI. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
What if the victim herself acted unreasonably or
unlawfully—can we say that the perpetrator’s liability
should be reduced because of her contributory negligence,
i.e., her failure “to accord herself due care?”77 As I have
already discussed in connection with Hurd’s and Husak’s
assumption of risk arguments, for unreasonable but lawful
75. Id.
76. Id. at 521.
77. Id., at 516-17.
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behavior, the answer should be “no.”78 What about the
unlawful conduct of the victim, which contributed to his
injury? Should the fault of “a victim who failed to strap her
seatbelt, or who herself drove drunk, or who neglected to
service the brakes of her vehicle”79 reduce the criminal
liability of the perpetrator? This issue is far too complicated
for the shorthand of this article, but I think that the answer
should be “yes,” to the extent the unlawful conduct of the
victim contributed to the harm that befell her.
I see a principled difference between the victim’s
careless but lawful behavior and her unlawful conduct in
the scope of the legitimate expectations of the perpetrator.
Numerous considerations, from liberty to legality, prohibit
punishing people for thoughtless but lawful behavior that
harmed no one but themselves. To the extent they do not
harm others, people have the right to be stupid, clumsy,
and irresponsible. So, when we make our plans and go
through our lives, we cannot rely on other people being
highly intelligent, alert, and prudent. Accordingly, if our
culpable actions cause others harm, we have no basis to
claim the reduction of liability based on their imperfect
behavior.
On the other hand, we have the right to expect that
other people obey the law (at least when their failure to do
so would directly affect us). If traffic rules require drivers
to stop at the red light, I should be able to rely on that rule.
Thus, if the victim did not stop, and our accident was
caused by both his failure to stop and my speeding, it
seems fair to reduce my liability. Moreover, even if I was
fully responsible for the accident, but due to the victim’s
unlawful failure to wear a seat belt, his injury turned out
to be more significant than it would be otherwise, it also
seems fair to reduce my liability for the harm, which is
attributable to the victim’s own fault.

78. See supra, notes 65-69 and the accompanying text.
79. Hurd, supra note 4, at 517.
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VII. ATTEMPT, ENDANGERMENT, AND OTHER RISK
CREATION
How would the principle of conditionality of rights
work in cases of attempts, endangerment, and other
instances of risk creation in which the actor does not
actually bring about the relevant social harm?80 Simons
asks: “If a speeding driver almost strikes the victim, but
misses, should it really matter whether the victim was
jaywalking?”81 Well, if we are willing to prosecute a driver
who almost struck a pedestrian, I don’t quite see why we
should deny the driver a defense. If the victim’s right to
physical inviolability was recklessly endangered, and we
view this endangerment as wrongdoing serious enough to
justify criminal punishment,82 it certainly matters to what
extent it was the defendant’s fault. Would Simons refuse to
consider the victim’s conduct even if the victim
intentionally threw himself in front of the car in an
unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide?
There is nothing idiosyncratic in my answer. We know
numerous examples of attempted crimes when the conduct
of the victim made all the difference for the liability of the
perpetrator. A defendant charged with an attempted
murder for shooting at the victim may be fully exonerated
if he acted in self-defense or may be found guilty of a lesser
offense if the victim provoked him.83
80. Simons, supra note 3, at 563-64.
81. Id. at 564.
82. See Model Penal Code § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also
Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963, 987-90 (2003)
(arguing that imposition of risk is a harm to the person on whom it is inflicted).
But see Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249 (1996);
Heidi M. Hurd, Nonreciprocal Risk Imposition, Unjust Enrichment, and the
Foundations of Tort Law: A Critical Celebration of George Fletcher’s Theory of
Tort Law, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 711 (2003); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World
Is Wrong?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 157, 193-208 (1994). Hurd contests the
claim that “risks to others are, by themselves, wrongs, and that individuals can
have rights against risks (rather than simply rights against harms).” Hurd,
supra note 4, at 519 n.21.
83. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 534 A.2d 1333, 1336 (Md. 1988) (an attempt to kill
a provoker is punishable as an attempted voluntary manslaughter); State v.
Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 597 (N.J. 1994) (same).
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It appears that the crucial question for the
determination of the perpetrator’s liability in inchoate
crimes is whether there is an identifiable victim. If such a
victim exists, his conduct has to be taken into account the
same way as in completed crimes. If, on the other hand,
the perpetrator is guilty of risk creation with respect to the
general public (e.g., an attempted terrorist act), there is no
particular victim(s) whose conduct may be relevant;
accordingly, the principle of conditionality of rights would
not warrant a defense. Now, what if the perpetrator
strikes against an aggressor or provoker but at the same
time recklessly endangers the lives of a group of innocent
bystanders (e.g., by throwing a hand grenade that
fortuitously failed to explode into a room full of people)? I
think it would make sense to conclude that the victim’s
aggressive or provocative conduct should be taken into
account to eliminate or reduce the perpetrator’s liability as
to that one person but not the rest of the group.
Generally speaking, the principle of conditionality of
rights should be applied to inchoate offenses the same way
it can be applied to completed offenses—if there is an
identifiable victim, the conduct of that victim may affect
the perpetrator’s liability.
VIII. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Another of Simons’s concerns involves multiple
defendants: “If a single defendant’s liability is properly
mitigated because of the victim’s fault, should it not also be
mitigated if a second defendant’s faulty or wrongful
conduct contributed to a victim’s harm (apart from whether
the victim’s own conduct is properly considered a
mitigation)?”84
Simons correctly deduces that no mitigation would be
available to two defendants engaged in criminal conduct
together, as conspirators or accomplices.85 He does not
84. Simons, supra note 3, at 564.
85. Id. (observing that, when two defendants act together, additional
culpability and danger of group criminality might preempt any possible
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discuss a case in which the harm is divisible, e.g., in which
two unrelated, independently acting defendants are
responsible for different harms. Say, as a result of
attending a restaurant, the victim suffers a theft and a
severe food poisoning. I don’t think Simons would have a
problem with holding each, the thief and the reckless cook,
responsible only for the harm he personally caused.86
The scenario Simons seems to have in mind is known
in the legal literature as concurrent overdetermination.87 A
typical example would be a case of two independent
concurrent fires, each sufficient to burn down the building,
which join and together destroy it.88 Simons asks: “[i]f two
independent speeding drivers collide and cause the victim’s
death, in circumstances where the speeding of either alone
would have been sufficient to cause the harm, should the
punishment for each be mitigated, because of the causal
contribution and fault of the other?”89
Simons apparently thinks that the principle of
conditionality of rights would mandate such mitigation.
This is an odd proposition and certainly one that does not
follow from my argument. Concurrent overdetermination
cases involve parties whose individual actions are
independent from anyone else’s actions (in terms of either
causation or culpability) and do not change the ultimate
amount of harm. Therefore, in those cases, consistently
with the principle of conditionality of rights and current
law, the conduct of any additional actor—a perpetrator or
the victim—does not have any effect on the liability of a
particular defendant.
For example, in Simons’s hypothetical, neither driver
would be entitled to any reduction of liability. Each
driver’s negligence is a “but for” and proximate cause of the
mitigation).
86. I assume the two crimes are truly unrelated, as opposed to, say, food
poisoning giving the thief an opportunity to steal the victim’s wallet.
87. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility, Soc. Phil. &
Pol’y, Summer 1999, at 1, 9-13; Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 1735 (1985).
88. See Moore, supra note 87, at 10.
89. Simons, supra note 3, at 564.
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fatal accident.90 Each collision is causally sufficient and
independent from the other—if the other driver did not
exist, the victim would still be dead. Conversely, outside of
the overdetermination context, when a collision results
from negligent actions of a driver and the victim, the causal
contribution of each party is a necessary condition of the
resulting harm. If the victim acted differently, he would
not be harmed.
More importantly, in Simons’s hypothetical, the
wrongful actions of one defendant toward the victim do not
reduce the obligations of the other defendant not to act
wrongfully toward the same victim. Accordingly, each of
them is guilty of violating the victim’s rights. In contrast,
the principle of conditionality of rights allows mitigating
the perpetrator’s liability only when the victim has acted in
such a way as to eliminate or reduce some of his rights,
thus
eliminating
or
reducing
the
perpetrator’s
responsibility for interfering with them.
Therefore, in accord with the principle of conditionality
of rights, the number of independent, simultaneously
acting defendants in cases of concurrent overdetermination
is completely irrelevant to the issue of their respective
criminal liability.
IX. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The final question I want to address is how the defense
of comparative criminal liability should be implemented.
According to my proposal, the comparative liability should
function as an affirmative defense.
In some circumstances, the victim’s conduct would provide a
complete justification, whereas in other circumstances it
would only mitigate the defendant’s liability. In any event,

90. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 87, at 29-30. See also Corey v. Havener, 65
N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) (holding both defendants liable in a case where each rode
his motorcycle by the victim’s horse, and the frightened horse injured the victim,
although the noise of even one motorcycle would have been sufficient to produce
the same result).
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the defendant would bear the burden of production. As for
the burden of persuasion, it may be more appropriate to
follow the MPC approach and allocate it to the prosecution,
unless specified otherwise.91

In this regard, two commentators, Husak and Simons,
express concerns.
Husak tries to envision how the
mechanism of mitigation will work in the case of partial
reduction of criminal liability. He correctly notes that the
structure of homicide offenses provides an ideal solution.
“When persons commit homicides, fault mitigators such as
provocation function as ‘imperfect defenses,’ allowing
defendants to be convicted of a lesser-included offense like
manslaughter.”92 He then goes on to warn that “lesserincluded offenses are rare outside the context of homicide;
there usually is no hierarchy of offenses for which
defendants whose fault is mitigated might be convicted.”93
I agree with Husak that the structure of homicide
offenses provides a convenient paradigm for applying any
partial defense, not just the one related to the victim’s
conduct. However, I disagree that, to incorporate a partial
defense, there is no other “alternative but for legislatures
to enact a number of lesser-included offenses for which
defendants whose liability is mitigated can be convicted.”94
One way to proceed, in the case of successful
invocation of the defense of comparative liability, is to
permit downgrading of an offense charged to a lower degree
or to another lesser related offense, regardless of whether
or not it is also lesser included.95 This solution would not
require too much legislative effort since the majority of
non-victimless crimes (and we need to deal only with those)
already have some less serious analogues, particularly in
the jurisdictions whose penal codes are modeled on the
91. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 487.
92. Husak, supra note 13, at 525.
93. Id. at 525-26.
94. Id. at 532.
95. An offense is considered lesser included only if “the elements of the lesser
offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989).
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MPC. For example, article 211 of the MPC includes
aggravated assault (a felony of the second or third degree),
simple assault (a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor), and
reckless endangerment (a misdemeanor). When warranted
by facts, say, homicide could be reduced to aggravated
assault or even reckless endangerment.96
True, recent decisions have purported to limit jury
instruction on lesser offenses to those which meet the strict
requirements for lesser-included offenses.97 Yet, as one
commentator has suggested, cases that limit lesser offense
instructions to included offenses typically rely on statutes
or rules.98 These cases have not considered that sometimes
a lesser offense can be a defense or defense theory. Thus, a
restriction of instruction on a lesser offense may be a
restriction of the defendant’s constitutional right to present
a defense. For that reason, one could argue that when an
instruction on a lesser non-included offense is necessitated
by a defense, including the defense of comparative liability,
it should be allowed.
I do not insist that this is the best strategy to
incorporating the defense of comparative liability. All I
mean to say is that if we believe that victims’ conduct is
and ought to be relevant to the criminal liability of
perpetrators (and Husak certainly seems to think so), we
have to find a way to make it a part of criminal law.
While Husak is concerned about expanding the law,
Simons worries about asking jurors to apply a multifactor
test, a comparative fault-like inquiry on a case-by-case
basis, thereby giving them too much discretion over the

96. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, notes 329-36, and the
accompanying text.
97. Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner: Obtaining Instruction on NonIncluded Lesser Offenses, 24 Champion 48, 48 (2000). See also, Carter v. United
States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000); Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (holding that
defendants’ right to a lesser charge jury instruction is limited to lesser-included
offenses only).
98. See Lundy, supra note 97, at 48. See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 555
S.W. 2d 252, 257 (Ky. 1977) (“Evidence suggesting that a defendant was guilty of
a lesser offense is, in fact and in principle, a defense against the higher charge
. . . .”).
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length of criminal punishments.99 I do not think Simons’s
worries are warranted. In practically any criminal trial,
jurors have to deal with a multifactor test. They have to
decide who had rights to what, who was at fault, and who
was causally responsible for the harm. They often have to
use a “comparative fault-type inquiry” in order to
determine whether the defendant acted reasonably.
Moreover, in many instances, that inquiry directly
translates into the verdict and the length of criminal
punishments. For example, in a case of involuntary
homicide, the difference between negligence, recklessness,
and recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life determines the choice between
negligent homicide (a felony of the third degree),
manslaughter (a felony of the second degree), and murder
(a felony of the first degree).100
In “Victims and Perpetrators,” I was primarily
interested in making a case for the defense of comparative
liability in criminal law and identifying general principles
supporting this defense. If this defense is recognized, it
certainly will be necessary to define its boundaries more
rigorously, coordinate its use with that of other defenses,
and overcome numerous practical obstacles. But, as I said,
if we believe that considerations of fairness, consistency,
and efficiency mandate the recognition of comparative
criminal liability, we may not reject the advocated defense
simply because it will take an effort to implement it.

99. See Simons, supra note 3, at 565 (“[Bergelson] articulates a multifactor
test, a comparative fault-type inquiry that apparently is to be applied by a jury
case by case, resulting, for example, in a reduction of one or more grades of the
crime, or in a mitigation of the usual sentence within a grade.”).
100. Model Penal Code §§ 210.2 & 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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